South Africa: Democracy without the people by Mattes, Robert




Perhaps more than any other democratizing country, South Africa
generates widely differing assessments of the present state and likely
future prospects of its democracy. If one takes the long view—compar-
ing South Africa today to where it was just 12 years ago—it is difficult
not to be enthusiastic about its accomplishments and its future. South
Africa successfully emerged from the shadow of apparently irrecon-
cilable conflict and unavoidable racial civil war to create a common
nation. It has negotiated two democratic constitutions and has held four
successful nationwide elections for national and local government. On
the economic front, it has avoided the triple-digit inflation that many
feared would accompany a populist economic strategy of redistribu-
tion and government intervention. It has stabilized the expanding debt
and reversed the double-digit inflation inherited from the apartheid-
era government. There have been impressive gains in employment
opportunities and income for the growing black middle class, and poor
blacks have seen unprecedented improvements in access to basic neces-
sities.
Yet if one looks at South Africa’s new democracy in a comparative
perspective, one’s enthusiasm is greatly tempered, if not altogether
removed. Crossnational analysis has highlighted three broad sets of
factors crucial to democratic consolidation: a growing economy that
steadily reduces inequality; stable and predictable political institutions;
and a supportive political culture. In terms of these factors, an analysis
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of South Africa yields, at best, some reasons for guarded optimism and,
at worst, many grounds for serious concern.
In each area, today’s South Africa presents a paradox. In terms of
political culture, South African society played a key role in achieving
democracy through its widespread opposition to the apartheid regime.
The country’s numerous and diverse civil society organizations range
from community grassroots groups to national trade unions and non-
governmental organizations. Yet citizens are not particularly supportive
of democratic rule and now display low levels of community and political
participation. Economically, macroeconomic stability, fiscal discipline,
and low inflation sit alongside weak business confidence, low growth,
massive unemployment, and rising intraracial inequality. Politically, an
internationally praised constitution designed to promote multiparty
competition and individual rights is overshadowed by one-party domi-
nance and limited governmental accountability. Thus, seven years into
its new dispensation, South Africa’s democracy in form appears to be
relatively healthy, but in substance shows signs of early decay.
Economic Development
South Africa’s economic policy makers should be proud of a number
of accomplishments. The national budget deficit has shrunk from 8
percent to around 2 percent of GDP. Public and private affirmative-action
initiatives in education, business ownership, and hiring have created a
sizeable black middle class.1 Since 1995, more than a million low-cost
houses have been built, and the poor now have access to free medicine
and more than 700 additional healthcare clinics. More than 5 million
needy children now get a fifth to a quarter of their daily nutritional needs
through school-based programs. More than 2 million people have
received access to electricity and 7 million to water.2 Relatively low
inflation, around 6 percent, means that working South Africans are able
to keep up with the cost of living.
Yet the sluggish economy has actually shed 500,000 formal jobs over
this period and deprived hundreds of thousands of households of the
income needed to make ends meet. Broadly defined, unemployment now
stands at 36 percent.3 A lack of business confidence has stifled both
domestic and foreign investment, thereby hampering growth. While
growth has been running at approximately 3 percent annually since 1995,
the government sees growth of 6 to 7 percent as a prerequisite to cutting
unemployment and reducing inequality.
Interracial inequalities have been reduced as a result of increasing
black incomes and the redistributive effects of government spending,
but inequality within all race groups has increased. Among blacks the
top one-fifth of all households have made impressive strides while the
bottom two-fifths have moved backwards.4
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Recently, a new specter has appeared on the economic horizon. In its
September 1999 decision to move forward with a R29.9 billion package
of arms purchases, the government appears to have ignored internal
feasibility studies warning that any depreciation of the currency could
increase costs significantly. This has in fact happened, and the full costs
of the deal are now estimated to be at least R50 billion. Indeed, the costs
of this deal threaten to spiral out of control and consume any future
funds the government had intended for increased poverty alleviation.
Disappointing Institutions
South Africa’s 1996 Constitution is the darling of both liberals and
social democrats around the world. Widely seen as a “state of the art”
document, it contains a wide array of classic political and socioeconomic
rights, institutional innovations such as the National Council of Provinces,
a range of independent watchdog agencies and commissions, and an
activist Constitutional Court. The electoral system (pure proportional
representation with no thresholds) has induced virtually all parts of politi-
cal society to play the electoral game and has allowed the representation
of a wide range of organized tendencies. Yet the constitutional framework
is significantly flawed in several respects, particularly with regard to the
interaction among party politics, voter representation, and legislative-
executive relations.
First of all, various features of the Constitution limit voters’ control
over their elected representatives. While the electoral system provides
for high degrees of “collective representation” (the overall balance
among parties mirrors aggregate election results) and “descriptive
representation” (the legislature tends to look like the electorate in terms
of ideology, race, and ethnicity), it has created no direct link between
legislators and voters. Constitutional provisions also eject from Parlia-
ment any member who leaves or is forced out of a political party, further
reducing any incentive for MPs to represent public opinions running
counter to the party line.
In addition, the Constitution does little to effect the separation of
powers between the legislature and the executive; other than a formal
vote of no confidence, few mechanisms exist with which the legislature
may check executive action. Any rigorous parliamentary oversight by
majority-party MPs places them in the difficult position of criticizing
senior party leaders, who could eject them from the party and hence
from Parliament. This ability to substitute loyal MPs for disloyal ones
also potentially enables the governing party to preclude any vote of no
confidence.
A minimalist theory of democracy would argue that, even with this
constitutional framework, sufficient public influence over government
can still be secured simply by holding regular free and fair elections.
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The threat of the next election forces the ruling party to “anticipate the
voters’ reactions” to current policy decisions and thus brings about an
acceptable level of popular control and accountability. In South Africa,
however, what is in theory a multiparty system is in fact completely
dominated by one party. The ruling African National Congress (ANC)
won 66 percent of the vote in 2000, up 4 percent from 1994, and is just
one seat shy of the two-thirds majority necessary to amend the
Constitution unilaterally. It also is the majority party in seven of the
nine provincial governments—enjoying overwhelming dominance in at
least five—and has decisive control in five of the country’s six largest
city governments. Part of this dominance is due to positive voter
evaluations of its performance, but part of it is also thanks to the
substantial number of dissatisfied black voters who do not identify with
the ANC yet have thoroughly negative views of virtually all other parties.5
For all intents and purposes, the ANC has few reasons to worry about
future voter reactions to its current decisions.
Over the past five years, this constitutional and electoral landscape has
resulted in several worrisome tendencies. First of all, there has been a trend
toward centralism within the ANC. National party structures have
increasingly extended their powers at the provincial and local levels;
candidates for provincial premierships and local mayoralties are now
nominated by a central committee rather than by provincial or local
branches. Several provincial party structures have simply been dissolved
and reformed by the national party, ostensibly because of “disunity” or “ill
discipline,” but critics have viewed these actions as attempts to head off
grassroots movements critical of the president. The national party machinery
has also deposed several provincial premiers, some of whom have been
popular leaders widely seen as future challengers for party leadership.
The ANC’s ability to eject people from Parliament by expelling them
from the party was underscored in 1997 when it jettisoned one of its
most popular figures, Bantu Holomisa, because he had publicly accused
a sitting cabinet minister and former Bantustan ruler of apartheid-era
corruption. Indeed, imposing party discipline has been an increasing
preoccupation. At a 2000 national party meeting, Secretary-General
Kgalema Motlanthe reminded members that “the principles of democratic
centralism still guided party structures.” New ANC members must
promise to combat “any tendency toward disruption or factionalism.”6
Moreover, the interval between party conferences has been extended
from three years to five, thereby limiting opportunities for the rank and
file to elect senior party organs.
Very recently, the ANC suddenly dropped its steadfast opposition to
legislators crossing the floor. This shift was prompted by a conflict that
emerged between the key partners of the main opposition coalition, the
Democratic Alliance (DA). As a result, the New National Party (the NNP
is the direct heir of the architects of apartheid) decided to exit the coalition
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and enter into talks with the ANC. The ANC changed its position
principally to enable NNP Cape Town city councilors to leave the DA
and cross into an alliance with the ANC, thus giving it control of the
only city government it did not already dominate. As this article went to
press, it has tabled legislation that would allow the president to declare
specific windows of time in which legislators at national, provincial,
and municipal levels could cross the floor to new or existing parties and
still keep their seats.7 Apart from the naked political opportunism
exhibited by these events, the ANC has yet to explain how it can allow
members to switch parties and still observe the constitutional requirement
that election results must result in proportional representation.
The increasing tendency of ANC central party bosses to stifle open
debate and dissent perhaps explains how the government was able to
impose one of its most important policies—the neoliberal “Growth,
Employment and Reconstruction” (GEAR) program—over the strong
objections of its alliance partners, the South African Communist Party
(SACP) and the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU).
SACP and COSATU members complain that “consultations” over
economic policy have amounted to little more than the ANC dictating
what the policy will be.8 COSATU and SACP MPs (who sit in Parliament
as ANC members) have chafed under the traditions of collective cabinet
decisions and “democratic centralism.” These simmering internal
differences finally exploded in August 2001 when union leaders, cabinet
ministers, and the president publicly exchanged insults, and massive
strikes were called in an effort to embarrass the government during the
United Nations antiracism conference in Durban.
Problems of Governance
Beyond its handling of its own internal affairs, the manner in which
the ANC has treated the institutions of governance is also a cause for
concern. The governing party has failed to heed the 1996 Constitution’s
call that it pass legislation to enable Parliament to amend spending bills.
(Currently, MPs only have the choice between accepting a bill or
rejecting it altogether.) Additionally, the ANC has recently introduced
two pieces of legislation containing seven separate amendments to the
Constitution. The most important would reorder the relationship between
the Appellate Court and Constitutional Court, scrap constitutional limits
on the tenure of Constitutional Court justices, put their tenure in the
hands of Parliament, enable the president to appoint two deputy ministers
who are not MPs, allow national government intervention in municipal
governments that do not comply with financial management standards,
and broaden the finance minister’s monopoly on introducing financial
legislation. Not only does this rapid and far-reaching change have grave
implications for the integrity of the Constitution, it is being attempted
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without giving other parties the opportunity to take positions on each
provision separately.9
On several occasions, the ANC has invoked party loyalty to prevent
Parliament from conducting effective oversight of executive action. In
1996, party leaders reportedly ordered members of the Portfolio
Committee on Health to refrain from any tough questioning of the health
minister during hearings on the unauthorized expenditure of R14 million
for a dubious HIV/AIDS education musical called Sarafina II.10 And
just recently, President Mbeki reportedly blocked internal party demands
that Majority Whip Tony Yengeni appear before Parliament’s Ethics
Committee to explain why he received—but did not report—a discounted
luxury truck from a European defense company that was bidding for an
arms subcontract.
The most profound crisis in executive-legislative relations, however,
originated in the R29.9 billion arms deal of 1999. In the second half of
2000, Parliament’s Standing Committee on Public Accounts (SCOPA)
began receiving allegations of nepotism, cronyism, and conflict of interest
having to do with the negotiation of the deal. After an auditor general’s
report questioned the government’s decision to select one of the more
expensive sets of available options and highlighted deviations from
accepted procurement practices, SCOPA (which traditionally operates
on nonpartisan lines and is headed by an opposition party MP) launched
its own inquiry, which included a high-profile anticorruption agency
called the Special Investigating Unit (SIU). Although Parliament
unanimously adopted a resolution in support of the inquiry, President
Mbeki and other ANC leaders quickly attacked the process due to the
inclusion of the SIU. The leader of the ANC delegation on SCOPA was
replaced. Under pressure from party leaders, SCOPA’s ANC members
distanced themselves from the inclusion of the SIU, broke off communi-
cation with other investigators, and blocked efforts to obtain further
information from the army and the government. The significance of this
episode is hard to overstate. Parliament may continue to play an active
role in developing and amending legislation in areas of no great interest
to the executive, but when there is a difference of opinion on matters
that are important to the executive, it will always prevail.
Perhaps no event better illustrates the troubling direction that South
African politics has taken than what is now simply known as “the plot.”
When intra-ANC tensions began to surface in 2001, Minister of Safety
and Security Steve Tshwete apparently took seriously charges that senior
ANC officials were enlisting other party members and journalists in an
anti-Mbeki campaign and (improbably) were spreading rumors implica-
ting Mbeki in the 1992 murder of SACP leader Chris Hani. Operating
on the strange assumption that the president’s life would be endangered
if these rumors were widely believed, Tshwete launched a police
investigation into the matter and the possible involvement of former
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premiers Mathews Phosa and Tokyo Sexwale, as well as Cyril Rama-
phosa, the father of the 1993 and 1996 constitutions. Moreover, Tshwete
went on national television to name the three as the subject of an official
police investigation into a “plot” against Mbeki.
In short, a faction of the ruling party was using the police to deter what
appeared to be legitimate canvassing, revealing that those in the highest
positions of power are capable of conflating internal lobbying and caucusing
with a treasonous “plot.” On the positive side, however, both Mbeki and
Tshwete quickly drew the wrath of COSATU, the SACP, and other key
voices in civil society and the media. Mbeki did eventually say that Tshwete
was “wrong” to publicly name the three, yet he chose not to fire the minister
and went so far as to say that Tshwete was only doing his duty.11
Another worrying aspect of South Africa’s institutional development
is the gap between the government’s aspirations and the state’s capacity.
While the government has demonstrated an impressive ability to use
parastatal agencies to deliver water, electricity, and telephones, and to
create government subsidies to allow people to purchase homes, the
picture is not nearly so impressive in other areas. The most obvious is
crime. Not only have most kinds of crime—especially violent crime—
increased substantially since 1994, but the number of prosecutions
launched and convictions attained has declined.12 Law enforcement is
so hard-pressed to fight ordinary crime that the national police commis-
sioner recently refused the minister of health’s request to commit person-
nel to enforce newly passed antismoking legislation. He also said that
there were no resources available to enforce new legislation on domestic
violence or on banning the use of cell phones by drivers.
One final problem of democratic governance in South Africa has less
to do with political institutions than with the personality of President
Thabo Mbeki and his stance on HIV/AIDS. In the face of one of the
highest HIV infection rates in the world, Mbeki has consistently chosen
to fritter away the considerable symbolic authority of his office by
questioning the causal link between HIV and AIDS, investing time and
resources in a presidential commission evenly divided between main-
stream and “dissident” scientists. The government has stalled, if not
blocked, funding for affordable anti-retroviral drugs and the distribution
of available drugs that would drastically reduce the rates of mother-to-
child transmission of HIV. Most recently, the government has moved to
discredit and suppress a report by the country’s Medical Research
Council that directly contradicts Mbeki’s attempts to minimize the impact
of AIDS.13
Trends in Public Opinion
A country’s political culture does not develop in a vacuum. Rather, it
is against a background of economic and political trends and develop-
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ments that public opinion about a democratic regime, a political system,
and citizenship must be assessed and understood. A review of a range
of public opinion indicators collected by the Institute for Democ-racy
in South Africa (Idasa) since 1995 demonstrates that South African
political culture is not yet mature enough to consolidate democratic
practices.14
South Africans’ support for democracy is lukewarm and has not grown
in any substantial way over the past five years. With increasingly tenuous
connections between the voters and their government and increasing
policy disaffection, trust in government and satisfaction with economic
and political performance are declining sharply. Perhaps most
importantly, the web of organizations and the impressive tradition of
popular participation that emerged to challenge the apartheid system
have withered. Indeed, across almost all the key indicators of democratic
political culture, South Africans compare quite poorly to their neighbors
throughout southern Africa and elsewhere on the continent.
National identity. One area of political culture that does not appear
to pose a major threat to democracy in South Africa, though it is often
thought to do so, is the so-called “national question.” The common view
holds that, in deeply divided societies such as South Africa, people
identify primarily with this or that component part—often their own
racial, ethnic, or religious group—rather than with the multiethnic or
multinational state. President Mbeki has entered this debate with his
“two nations” thesis, which states that South Africa comprises “two
nations,” one relatively wealthy and largely white and the other relatively
poor and overwhelmingly black. Although Mbeki’s economic prognosis
may still be largely correct, there is no evidence that the word “nation”
ought to be applied to these economic divisions.
In fact, surveys since 1995 have revealed widespread popular consen-
sus on the existence of a South African political community that tran-
scends racial and economic divisions. Nationally, 90 percent or more
are proud of being called South African, say it is a key part of how they
see themselves, and want their children to think of themselves as South
African. It is important to note, however, that there are some cracks in
this consensus, as the proportions of white and Indian respondents
agreeing with some of these items fell an average of 10 percent between
1995 and 2000.
To be sure, these high levels of self-identification with the nation
exist alongside strong ties to subnational self-defined identity groups.
Yet this may not be so much a contradiction as an indication that members
of historically competing groups feel sufficiently comfortable to identify
with a larger national community only when they have a strong sense of
communal identity. And just as it is mistaken to assume that economic
divisions necessarily translate into different visions of nationhood, it is
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also mistaken to assume that a strong sense of national community
necessarily brings about domestic tranquility. Indeed, high levels of
national identity coexist with significant levels of in-group chauvinism,
out-group rejection, racism, and intolerance.15
Yet few South Africans cite racism or discrimination as a problem
requiring government intervention. In 1994, six months after the first
election, one in five respondents spontaneously cited problems of
discrimination and the removal of apartheid as one of the three “most
important problems facing this country that government ought to
address.” Since then, however, no more than 5 percent have mentioned
this issue. A recent survey by the South African Institute of Race
Relations found that racism was rated ninth on a list of “unresolved
problems,” with just 8 percent listing it as a priority matter. In fact, 48
percent of the total sample (and 49 percent of black respondents) said
that race relations had improved in recent years, while 25 percent said
they had deteriorated.16
Support for democracy. As of July–August 2000, 60 percent of South
Africans said that democracy “is preferable to any other kind of
government,” and 55 percent said that democracy is always the best
form of government “even if things are not working.” Yet just 30 percent
said they were “unwilling” to live under a nonelected government that
was also able to “impose law and order, and deliver houses and jobs.”
On none of these items is there any evidence of increased support for
democracy since 1995.
Yet South Africans are likely to reject authoritarian alternatives to
liberal democracy when they are mentioned. Three-fourths would dis-
approve of abandoning multiparty elections for military rule, 66 percent
would disapprove of a presidential dictatorship, and 65 percent would
disapprove of a return to apartheid, but just 56 percent would disapprove
of one-party rule. Moreover, only 40 percent reject all four alternatives.17
South Africans’ support for democracy and rejection of authoritarian
rule are consistently lower than in most of the eight southern African
countries where Afrobarometer surveys have been conducted (generally
ahead only of Lesotho and sometimes Namibia); on those items that
have been asked in 12 countries across the continent, South Africa ranks
as one of the lowest.18
Many more South Africans give positive evaluations to the present
political system (58 percent) than to the apartheid regime (25 percent).
These figures, however, show a significant increase since 1995 in
“nostalgia” for the way the country is perceived to have been governed
under apartheid, especially among white, “colored,” and Indian
respondents. And while South Africans widely prefer their present form
of government to what they had before, their optimism about how they
will be governed in the future has declined noticeably.
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An important aspect of South Africans’ attitudes toward democracy
is their highly economic and substantive understanding of the concept.
When unprompted, South Africans spontaneously see democracy as the
realization of individual rights and civil liberties. When provided with a
list of constitutive elements of democracy, however, an average of 60
percent say that socioeconomic goods are “essential” for a country to be
called democratic, while an average of just 35 percent say the same
about procedural components like regular elections, multiparty com-
petition, and freedom of speech. This 25-point “gap” between substantive
and procedural understandings of democracy is by far the largest in
southern Africa.
Evaluations of democratic performance. Although many inter-
national analysts place South Africa at the forefront of democratic
development in Africa,19 the country’s own citizens are not so sanguine.
In 2000, one year after the second successful democratic national
election, nearly three-quarters thought the 1999 election had been either
“completely free and fair” (42 percent) or “free and fair with some minor
problems” (31 percent). Yet the citizens of Namibia (78 percent) and
Botswana (83 percent) were even more optimistic when evaluating their
recent elections. And when asked to assess the extent of democracy in
their country, 60 percent of South Africans said the country was either
“completely democratic” (26 percent) or “democratic with some minor
exceptions” (34 percent). This figure placed South Africans parallel to
Zambians and Malawians (62 percent) but behind Namibians (71 percent)
and citizens of Botswana (83 percent), the region’s oldest democracy.
Finally, 52 percent are satisfied with “the way democracy works in South
Africa,” which is higher than the 41 percent registered in 1995 but down
from the 63 percent of November 1998. It is also lower than the figure
recorded in Botswana (75 percent), Namibia (64 percent), Zambia (59
percent), or Malawi (57 percent).
Views of political institutions. When assessing their political
institutions, South Africans are becoming increasingly pessimistic. As
of July–August 2000, trust in elected institutions, approval ratings of
elected officials’ job performances, and the extent to which people saw
them as responsive to public opinion were all at the lowest levels yet
measured under the new political system. Only 41 percent of respondents
said they trusted President Mbeki, and 34 percent said they could trust
Parliament. For such state institutions as the army, the courts, the police,
and the criminal justice system, trust ranged from 35 to 44 percent. Fifty
percent of South Africans approved of Mbeki’s performance over the
preceding 12 months, and 45 percent approved of Parliament.
A large part of this trend can be attributed to a general economic
downturn and the accumulating political problems confronting the Mbeki
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government. For example, job creation has consistently been seen as
the country’s “most important problem,” cited as such by 76 percent of
all respondents in 2000. Yet just 10 percent approved of the government’s
efforts to create jobs. Sixty percent cited crime and security as a priority
concern, yet just 18 percent approved of the way government has handled
the problem. Indeed, surveys conducted by the Human Sciences Research
Council showed that the proportion who said they felt “safe” or “very
safe on most days” fell dramatically from 73 percent in 1994 to 44 percent
in 1999.20
In addition, while public perceptions of corruption leveled off in 2000,
they remain very high. Thus, even before the investigation of the arms
deal, 50 percent of all South Africans felt that most or all government
officials were involved in corruption. Two-thirds felt that the new
government was at least as corrupt as the apartheid regime. How the
ANC confronts the growing accusations of influence-buying and conflict
of interest in the arms deal will tell us a great deal about the future
course of public opinion.
Declining trust in government must also be attributed to the
aforementioned flaws in South Africa’s representative system. By 2000,
only 54 percent of blacks and 46 percent of all respondents felt that the
president was interested in their opinions; 48 percent and 42 percent,
respectively, felt similarly toward Parliament; and only 33 and 31 percent
said so about their local governments.
Economic evaluations. Individual evaluations of the economy have
paralleled the country’s macroeconomic trends. As recently as April
1999, more than half of all South Africans were optimistic about the
country’s economic future. By July–August 2000, however, just over
one-quarter expected the economy to improve in the next year (the figure
went from 63 to 35 percent among black respondents). Perceptions of
relative deprivation have also increased sharply. Even in 1995, despite
one of the highest rates of income inequality in the world, only 32 percent
of South Africans said they were worse off than others. This was largely
due to the fact that black South Africans tended to compare themselves
to other blacks rather than to whites. By mid-2000, however, this figure
had increased sharply to 50 percent. In the same survey, 31 percent of
blacks said their lives were worse now than under apartheid, up sharply
from 13 percent in 1997.
Citizenship and participation. The most troubling of the survey results
are probably the data on citizen participation and interaction with
government. South Africa now has one of the most passive citizenries
in southern Africa. As of mid-2000, only 11 percent of South Africans
said they “frequently” engaged in political discussion and 12 percent
said they paid attention to government and public affairs “always” or
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“most of the time.” Both figures were the lowest yet measured since
1995, and also the lowest out of seven southern African countries. South
Africans are less likely to participate in community-level organizations
(such as church or self-help groups) or political actions (such as attending
election rallies or working for a party) than Zimbabweans, Zambians,
Malawians, or Namibians.
Of even greater concern are South Africans’ extremely low levels of
actual contact with government leaders or other influential community
leaders. Just 6 percent said they had contacted a government or party
official in the previous year to give them their views, and only 10 percent
had contacted any other community leader. Both figures are the lowest
in southern Africa. Perhaps the most damning finding of the entire 2000
survey was that just 0.2 percent—that is, only four of the 2,200
respondents—said they had made contact with a sitting member of
Parliament in 1999–2000. Absolutely no one in the sample said he had
attended any hearing or meeting organized by Parliament or by an MP.
This passivity cannot be traced to a lack of information, since South
Africans actually have the highest rates of radio, television, and
newspaper coverage in the region. Neither can it be traced to poverty,
since South Africa’s much poorer neighbors tend to have far higher rates
of contact.
Fostering Citizenship
Although the public opinion data reviewed here are worrisome, they
do not suggest a deeply held “culture” of norms, values, beliefs, or
predispositions inhospitable to democracy. Rather, it would be more
accurate to see the current contours of public opinion as consequences
of, or even reactions to, the problems facing South Africa’s economic
and institutional development. South Africans’ support for democracy
is modest, in part, because they understand democracy to mean the
delivery of a range of socioeconomic goods, and progress toward this
goal had been slow.
Surveys show that, compared to other countries in the region, South
Africans have had one of the highest rates of participation in protest
action in the past and are among the most likely to resort to protest
again, given the reason and the opportunity. This rules out any notion
of an inherent “culture” of apathy or passivity. South Africans participate
at low rates between elections because the system offers them few
incentives do to so. They do not contact parliamentarians or attend
parliamentary “outreach” hearings at least in part because they do not
know who their parliamentarians are and because MPs have no incentive
to reach out to people.
Afrobarometer results from southern Africa underscore the strong
impact of constitutional design, especially the electoral system, on the
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degree of citizen-MP contact. In Namibia and South Africa, the two
countries with proportional representation, the rate of contact with an
MP or attendance at a parliamentary meeting or hearing is 1 percent and
0.2 percent, respectively. Among the five countries with first-past-the-
post systems, contact rates are 7 percent in Zimbabwe and Zambia and
5 percent in Malawi and Lesotho. (Botswana is the “outlier” with a
contact rate of 2 percent.) While all these figures may sound low, there
is a huge difference between one out of every 10 or 20 people in each
community having had contact with their elected national representatives
and one out of every 100 or 200.
While South Africa is admired internationally for the negotiating skills
and processes it has developed since 1990, as well as for its state-of-the-
art Constitution, its citizens have been left behind by the past decade’s
preoccupation with elite bargaining and institutional design. South Africans
need to shift the focus onto problems of citizenship, representation, and
participation. In the next decade, they need to put as much emphasis on
building a grassroots culture of citizenship as they have already put on
building a culture of elite accommodation. This requires renewed emphasis
on civic education by schools and civil society organizations, in order to
teach citizens the intrinsic value of democracy and equip them with the
resources necessary to participate more fully in the political process.
Furthermore, this requires institutions that encourage meaningful
participation. South African constitutional designers need to rethink their
assumptions about how institutions interact with ordinary people, and
they must abandon the view (implicit in the present constitution) that
citizen participation emanates from a sense of duty rather than from
incentives and self-interest. Therefore, public participation in democratic
government should be encouraged not through special processes or for-
ums but by giving citizens reasons to engage with their elected represen-
tatives nationally, provincially, and locally. This requires legislators and
councilors who can listen to identifiable constituencies and be persuaded
by them, and who can in turn act according to the wishes of the voters.
This goal can be accomplished by a system of strong separation of powers
with weak party discipline, but it can also be accomplished in a
parliamentary system, as long as party caucuses are democratic and
autonomous from the executive. Either way, more effective constituency
representation is a necessary, though not sufficient, condition to bring
about greater contact between citizens and representatives.
Indeed, the window for electoral reform in South Africa is now open,
if only because existing electoral legislation has lapsed and the ANC
has begun the process of amending related legislation in order to
cooperate with the NNP. But simply creating single-member or
multimember districts will not be enough. Representatives must also be
required to live in their districts, since if parties can “parachute” members
into “safe districts” or “helicopter” them out when they face defeat, it
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will remove any incentive for MPs to anticipate voter reactions. Finally,
lifting the ban on floor-crossing, as the ANC recently proposed, is
misguided. Changing parties mid-term is an undemocratic violation of
the implicit contract under which a candidate stands for election, and it
also disturbs the proportionality created by the voters. It would be better
to amend the Constitution so that MPs have to give up their seats only if
they choose to leave their political party, not if they are forced out.
Mavericks who want to challenge party discipline will be less likely to
be intimidated by party bosses if they know they can still keep their
parliamentary seats if they are expelled from the party.
Together, these reforms should give legislators greater incentives to
reach out to voters and to represent them, and give citizens and interest
groups more reason to contact their representatives and interact with
legislative bodies. In addition, they could help representatives more
effectively oversee and check the actions of mayors, premiers, and
presidents. Without such reforms, it is difficult to imagine the consoli-
dation of South African democracy.
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